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A basic lesson from Pfizer’s trademark battles over Viagra in 
China is that if multinational companies (MNCs) have not already 
created a Chinese transliteration for their English-language 
trademarks, the Chinese media and Chinese consumers will 
immediately create one. The brand owner might then lose control or 
ownership of the Chinese transliteration as a trademark in China, 
which is exactly what happened to Pfizer’s Viagra. Pfizer does not 
own the Chinese-language trademark by which Viagra is best known 
in China and in the entire Chinese speaking world. This lapse has 
resulted in a significant business loss for Pfizer. 
At least for global brands, U.S.-based MNCs may need to obtain 
a Chinese-language trademark registration in China before or at the 
same time that the brand owner launches its trademark or brand to 
the public in the United States. Obtaining a Chinese-language 
trademark before the English-language mark becomes public and the 
Chinese media subjects it to transliterations should allow the brand 
owner to establish its own Chinese-language transliteration for its 
English-language trademark and to exercise greater control over 
how the brand is presented in China.  
Pfizer, Inc. is a U.S.-based multinational company (MNC) with 
trademarks and patents for its blockbuster drug, Viagra,1 in the 
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United States and many countries around the world.2 Pfizer is the 
largest pharmaceutical company in the world by revenue.3 It does 
business in foreign markets and has access to world class legal 
resources to protect its intellectual property rights around the world.4 
Pfizer has invested at least $500 million in the People’s Republic of 
China (China) for production facilities and a research and 
development center in Shanghai, and has targeted China—projected 
to be the third largest market for pharmaceuticals in the world behind 
the United States and Japan—as a key market for its products.5 In 
China, aphrodisiacs of all kinds are eagerly sought after. Viagra is no 
exception.  
Under these circumstances, it might seem surprising that Pfizer 
does not own the best-known name for Viagra in China, Weige (伟 
哥) or ―Great Older Brother.‖6 A Chinese company, Guangzhou 
Viamen Pharmaceutical Company (Viamen), owns Weige.7 Instead, 
Pfizer owns Wai Aike (万艾可),8 a transliteration of Viagra that has 
no meaning in Chinese and lacks the cachet, wit, and the appeal of 
Weige.  
Many companies would consider this situation a disaster and 
business schools would be clamoring to engage in case studies of 
what went wrong and how to correct these mistakes. Yet little has 
been written in depth about the cultural issues and the limits on the 
application of the legal principles of international trademark law that 
contributed to this problem for Pfizer. Perhaps more importantly, no 
 
 1. Viagra is a pill used by men to treat erectile dysfunction. Common Questions About 
Viagra, PFIZER, INC., http://www.viagra.com/questions.aspx (last visited Feb. 24, 2012). 
 2. See generally PFIZER, INC., ANNUAL REVIEW (2010), available at 
http://www.pfizer.com/files/annualreport/2010/annual/review2010.pdf (reviewing Pfizer’s 
global operations and products for FY 2010). 
 3. Id. at 8. 
 4. See generally id.  
 5. YAHONG LI ET AL., ASIA CASE RESEARCH CTR. & COLUMBIA BUS. SCH., VIAGRA IN 
CHINA: A PROLONGED BATTLE OVER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 3, 16 (2010).  
 6. Shuang Lewis, Pfizer Loses Appeal over Viagra Trademark Case in China, GLOBAL 
INSIGHT, July 10, 2009. For a general discussion of the importance of intellectual property in 
modern international business, see DANIEL C. K. CHOW & EDWARD LEE, INTERNATIONAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 4–11 (2006). 
 7. Lewis, supra note 6. The Chinese company that owns the trademark name ―Weige,‖ 
is known by several names including Welman Pharmaceutical and Viaman Pharmaceutical. 
See id; Pfizer Wins Landmark Viagra Ruling in China, ECON. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2006, 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2006-12-28/news/27420462_1_viagra-weige-
production-of-blue-rhomboid. 
 8. George Chan, Branding Strategies for Pharmaceutical Trademarks in China, 
WORLD TRADEMARK REV., May–June, 2008, at 82, 82. 
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one, to the author’s knowledge, has yet distilled the lessons learned 
from the missteps made by Pfizer. This article addresses the cultural 
and legal issues that Pfizer encountered in launching its Viagra 
trademark in China and sets forth some lessons that can help other 
MNCs avoid similar problems in the future.9  
The first part of this article describes the legal battles that Pfizer 
faced in China involving its trademark for Viagra.10 Despite several 
lawsuits, Pfizer has failed to gain ownership of the Chinese 
trademark for Viagra, Weige, and has been unable to force Viamen 
and others to stop using the trademark.11 
Part two of this article sets forth the basic principles of 
trademark protection across national borders. These basic principles 
must be understood against the particular context of the cultural and 
linguistic issues that make registration of foreign language 
trademarks and their Chinese-language transliterations traps for the 
unwary.12 Despite over three decades of doing business in China, 
MNCs continue to stumble into traps caused by differences in culture 
and history. Part two also analyzes the cultural issues that are 
involved when U.S. brand owners seek trademark protections 
overseas. In particular, these cultural issues vary significantly in 
different parts of the world. The assumptions that MNCs make 
concerning the protection of their U.S. trademarks in other English 
speaking countries and in Europe do not apply with equal force in 
China and other Asian countries.  
Part three discusses how MNCs can avoid Pfizer’s problem in 
the future. In China, the dominance of Chinese culture—in particular 
Chinese language—means that MNCs must develop a Chinese-
language trademark early in the process for brands with a target 
global market.13 The brand owner should obtain a Chinese trademark 
registration for the transliteration of its English-language trademark 
from the China Trademark Office (CTMO), before or at the same 
time that the brand owner introduces its English-language trademark 
 
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. Pfizer also faced challenges over its patents in China. See LI ET AL., supra note 5, at 
11–13. However, Pfizer ultimately had the validity of its patent for Viagra upheld by PRC 
authorities in 2006. Id. at 13. This article focuses on the trademark and not patent law issues. 
The patent law issues are complex and deserve an independent treatment on their own.  
 11. Lewis, supra note 6. 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See infra Part III. 
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to the media.14 This is one of the most important lessons of the 
Viagra case.15  
I. BACKGROUND OF PFIZER’S LEGAL BATTLES OVER ITS 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OF VIAGRA IN CHINA 
Although Pfizer officially launched Viagra in 1998,16 the media 
reported on the drug throughout the 1990s and by 1996 it was already 
well known that Pfizer was completing clinical studies that would 
allow it to launch Viagra in the United States.17 In 1998, Pfizer 
launched Viagra with great fanfare in the United States and Europe.18 
The drug was an immediate success.19 From 2006–2011, sales in the 
United States alone have generated close to $5.2 billion.20 Today, 
Pfizer earns annual revenues of $1.9 billion from sales of Viagra 
worldwide.21  
Interest in Viagra was so keen that the drug received intense 
media coverage even before Pfizer obtained a U.S. trademark 
registration for the name.22 Pfizer filed its U.S. trademark application 
for Viagra in the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) on April 12, 1996 and, after examination, the USPTO 
 
 14. See infra Part III.  
 15. As an alternative, albeit a less attractive one, the brand owner can file both the 
English-language and Chinese-language trademarks at the same time in the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office and then file the same marks in China within a six month 
period and obtain the U.S. filing date for both marks in China. Infra Part III.B. The six 
month period is known as the period of Paris Priority. Infra Part II.A.  
 16. Gina Kolata, U.S. Approves Sale of Impotence Pill; Huge Market Seen, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 26, 1998 at A1. 
 17. Ron Winslow, Pfizer Explores Treatment for Impotence, WALL ST. J., May 6, 1996 
at B8. 
 18. See LI ET AL., supra note 5, at 1.  
 19. Justin Gillis, Pfizer’s Stock Soars on Success of Drug; New Impotence Pill Boosts 
Firm’s Value, WASH. POST, April 21, 1998, at C1. 
 20. For Pfizer’s financial statement reflecting U.S. sales of Viagra from 2006 thru 2011 
see generally PFIZER, INC., FINANCIAL REPORTS (2006–2011), available at http:// 
www.pfizer.com/investors/financial_reports/financial_reports.jsp. Pfizer’s share of the 
market for erectile dysfunction drugs has decreased steadily since its introduction. See 
Alison Keith, The Economics of Viagra, 19 HEALTH AFF. 147, 148–49 (2000) (describing a 
drop in sales after men not suffering from erectile dysfunction discovered that Viagra had no 
effect on their sexual performance). The introduction of competing prescription pills and 
black-market imitators also account for the decrease in Viagra’s performance in the market. 
See LI ET AL., supra note 5, at 10 (describing Viamen’s sale of an erectile dysfunction drug 
without the active Sidenafil component).  
 21. PFIZER, INC., 2010 FINANCIAL REPORT 25 (2011).  
 22. See, e.g., Winslow, supra note 17.  
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issued the registration on June 2, 1998.23 However, Pfizer executives 
were using the ―Viagra‖ name in public even before the Viagra 
trademark application was filed in the USPTO.24 On May 5, 1996, 
less than a month after Pfizer filed the trademark registration and 
long before the USPTO issued the registration, Pfizer reported on the 
highly anticipated positive results of clinical studies on Viagra before 
the American Urological Association.25 English-language media 
reported widely on this event and repeatedly referred to Viagra by 
name.26 By early 1996, Pfizer’s drug was already drawing worldwide 
attention by its brand name—Viagra.27  
By 1996, Pfizer decided that China would be an important 
market for the drug and filed a trademark application for the English-
language name Viagra with the CTMO on October 24, 1996.28 
Apparently, Pfizer did not feel rushed to file a Chinese transliteration 
of its English trademark immediately and did not file its first 
Chinese-language trademark application until May 1997.29 Perhaps 
Pfizer did not feel pressed to file a Chinese-language trademark 
because Pfizer had to first obtain approval from the PRC State Food 
and Drug Administration (SFDA) before it could legally sell the drug 
in China.30 Pfizer did not obtain formal approval from the SFDA until 
 
 23. VIAGRA, Registration No. 2,162,548. 
 24. See Pfizer Says Aricept may get Quick FDA Filing, REUTERS NEWS, Mar. 25, 1996 
(reporting that Pfizer executive vice-president discussed Viagra at a conference in London). 
 25. Winslow, supra note 17. 
 26. See, e.g., Paul Recer, Potency Pill May be Available in a Year, HOUS. CHRON., May 
6, 1996 at A7 (―The company plans to market sildenafil under the brand name Viagra.‖). 
 27. See New Drug Offers Hope for the Impotent, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, May 6, 
1996. 
 28. VIAGRA, Registration No. 1,130,739 (China). 
 29. LI ET AL., supra note 5, at 29. In 1997, Pfizer attempted to register ―Wei Ergang‖ (威 
而 钢), which was rejected by the CTMO. Pfizer’s name Wei Ergang means ―Mighty and 
Strong‖ or ―Mighty and Firm.‖ One of the grounds upon which CTMO rejected the 
application on the grounds that it was too sexually suggestive. See id. at 8. In the author’s 
view, this attempt indicates that Pfizer did not have a sophisticated understanding about 
Chinese culture. While Chinese consumers found Weige (伟 哥) or Great Older Brother to 
be appealing, most Chinese consumers would probably find Wei Ergang to be unappealing 
because it lacks subtlety and wit. See id. By comparison to Weige, it seems to be clumsy and 
even crude. See id. Wei (威) implies strength and power and gang (钢) refers to steel. Rather 
than defusing social pressures, the crude and suggestive nature of the name and the claim 
that it appears to be making might be viewed as intensifying such pressures. See id. After 
Wei Ergang was rejected, Pfizer finally settled on Wan Aike and eventually received a PRC 
trademark registration. Id.  
 30. See Main Responsibilities, STATE FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CHINA, http:// 
eng.sfda.gov.cn/WS03/CL0756/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2012) (stating that the SFDA’s duties 
include monitoring registration and supervision of drugs and overseeing the quality and 
safety of drugs). 
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July 2000.31 Pfizer might have believed that without SFDA approval, 
there was no reason to rush to file a trademark application for a 
Chinese transliteration of Viagra because the drug could not be 
legally sold in China under any brand name. 
Meanwhile, soon after Pfizer officially launched Viagra in the 
United States in 1998, vendors began to illegally import Viagra pills 
into China’s nightclubs, hotels, and massage parlors.32 Some street 
vendors even began to hawk Viagra in large cities in China.33 Not 
surprisingly, Viagra proved to be immensely popular in China as 
soon as it became available in the United States and Europe.34 
Although the precise source and date is unclear, sometime in the 
period between the first flurry of international media attention given 
to Viagra in the mid-1990s and shortly after the official launch of 
Viagra in the United States, the Chinese media coined the 
transliteration Weige for Viagra.35  
Pfizer failed to realize that because of the U.S. media coverage 
of the launch of Viagra in the mid to late 1990s, the Chinese media 
would not use the word Viagra, but instead would give the product a 
Chinese transliterated name. Perhaps, Pfizer never fully appreciated 
the difference between markets in which English is the native or 
dominant language and markets in which the native population does 
not speak English.36 For example, in countries such as Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and some EU countries, people speak English as a 
native language or with such a high level of proficiency that many 
English words, phrases, and brand names are commonly interspersed 
in business and daily conversation.37 In China and many other East 
Asian countries, most people will never colloquially refer to a brand 
 
 31. LI ET AL., supra note 5, at 29.  
 32. Id. at 8.  
 33. Id.  
 34. See Keith, supra note 20, at 150 (describing the quadrupling of market for erectile 
dysfunction treatment in the United States and a 500% price differential for Viagra in the 
United States and China). 
 35. LI ET AL., supra note 5, at 29 (stating that a Chinese newspaper in the United States 
referred to Viagra as Weige). 
 36. See Aref. A. Alashan et al., International Brand-Name Standardization/Adaptation: 
Antecedents and Consequences, 10 J. INT´L MARKETING 22, 25–26 (2002) (discussing the 
various issues a firm may encounter when internationalizing a brand name).  
 37. This creates a different set of issues as many European countries are now concerned 
about the dominance of English as a business language and concerned that English will 
compromise their native languages. See Mark Dolliver, Beyond European Fears of a 
Monogolot Future, ADWEEK, May 14, 2001, http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising/ 
beyond-european-fears-monoglot-future-takes-48896. Some European countries have taken 
steps to curtail the creep of English into their native languages. Id.  
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or trademark by its English-language name, no matter how famous or 
prestigious.38 A full discussion of the reasons for this cultural practice 
in China is beyond the scope of this article;39 it suffices for present 
purposes to note that because of history, culture, and the sheer 
dominance of Chinese language in China, Chinese media and 
consumers will always use a Chinese transliteration of an English 
trademark rather than the English word itself. This practice in China 
even applies to the most famous international brands in the world, 
including Coca-Cola and McDonald’s. Almost no Chinese consumers 
will refer to these brands by their English name, except in business 
dealings with foreign nationals who speak English.40 Given the 
dominance of Chinese language, Pfizer could have predicted that 
once Viagra became a frequent topic of discussion in the international 
media, the Chinese media and Chinese consumers—not Pfizer—
would give Viagra a Chinese name (Weige), which was a 
transliteration of the English word.41 This transliteration occurred 
before Pfizer attempted to register a Chinese trademark for Viagra in 
China.42  
From the perspective of the brand owner in the United States, the 
proliferation of an unregistered name can create several business 
problems. One serious issue that arises is that the brand owner loses 
control over the Chinese-language name for its brand.43 The name 
chosen by the Chinese media or consumers could in some cases be 
deliberately unflattering or inappropriate. An even more serious 
problem can occur: a Chinese entity might obtain a registration for 
the Chinese transliteration of the English brand name before the U.S. 
 
 38. See Fabio Giacopello, Breaking Down the Great Wall of Language, INTELLECTUAL 
PROP. MAG. (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.ipworld.com/ipwo/doc/view.htm?id=276259 
&searchCode=H.  
 39. A simple, non-technical explanation is that the sounds in standard Chinese-spoken 
language are determined by Chinese-written language, which consists of ideographs or 
characters, not an alphabet. Chinese characters contain only a limited number of sounds and 
tones. While new sounds can be created in English through novel combination of the English 
alphabet, no new sounds can be created in Chinese because all sounds are fixed by the 
limited universe of Chinese characters. New words in Chinese and transliterations of 
foreign-language words into Chinese are created by novel combinations of Chinese 
characters all with existing sounds but no new sounds can be created. This information is 
based on the author´s own observations and experiences. 
 40. See Giacopello, supra note 38.  
 41. See F.C. Hong et al., Brand Name Translation: Language Constraints, Product 
Attributes, and Consumer Perceptions in East and Southeast Asia, 10 J. INT´L MARKETING 
29, 29 (2002) (―[F]oreign marketers . . . must consider the form, content, style, and image [a] 
translation requires in particular market segments‖).  
 42. LI ET AL., supra note 5, at 29. 
 43. See Giacopello, supra note 38.  
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brand owner can do so in China. This is exactly what occurred in the 
case of Viagra.  
Weige posed a complex problem for Pfizer because it was much 
more successful than Wan Aike, the Chinese name that Pfizer 
eventually chose.44 Weige (伟哥), which can be translated as ―Great 
Older Brother,‖ was an immediate hit not just in China but in the 
entire Chinese speaking world.45 Weige is an almost exact 
homophone of Viagra, but that does not explain its success.  
Although sexual mores in China have relaxed considerably as 
China has engaged in trade and cultural exchanges with the West, 
customs are generally much more conservative than in many parts of 
the Western world. A light-hearted name helps to diffuse some of the 
social pressures created by conservative sexual attitudes. For all of its 
recent economic progress, China remains a country with many 
economic, social, and political problems that plague the daily lives of 
its citizens;46 humor is often used in China to deal with difficult 
political or sensitive social issues.47 ―Wei‖ means ―great‖ but in the 
sense of respect and reputation, and does not necessarily carry a 
connotation of physical strength, force, or violence. The term ―ge‖ 
(哥) or ―older brother‖ is often used as a term of affection or respect 
and was thought to be especially appealing to China’s female 
population in connection with this drug. Weige, a gentle and 
humorous name, spoke to China’s consumers and appeared to be 
right in line with China’s cultural attitudes towards sex.48  
Issues within Pfizer’s own business culture may have 
contributed to the problem. Although Weige proved to be immensely 
popular in the Chinese-speaking world, it is not a name that Pfizer 
would likely have chosen at the time. Like many U.S.-based 
pharmaceutical companies, Pfizer prefers scientific, technical, and 
 
 44. Chan, supra note 8, at 82.  
 45. Id. 
 46. See generally John W. Lewis & Xue Litai, Social Change and Political Reform in 
China: Meeting the Challenge of Success, 176 CHINA Q. 926 (2003).  
 47. See Brook Larmer, Where an Internet Joke Is Not Just a Joke, N.Y. TIMES MAG., 
Oct. 26, 2011, at 34 (describing Chinese humor as subtle and ironic in the face of rigorous 
state censorship).  
 48. See June N.P. Francis et al., The Impact of Linguistic Differences on International 
Brand Name Standardization: A Comparison of English and Chinese Brand Names of 
Fortune-500 Companies, 10 J. INT´L MARKETING 98, 113–14 (2002) (reporting on the results 
of a study suggesting that firms can capitalize on the localization of their brand names by 
adopting names that are more meaningful, reflect more positive connotations, reflect more 
product benefits or characteristics, and possess more desirable linguistic characteristics than 
the original names).  
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impressive Latin sounding names in English that carry a certain 
gravitas for its drugs.49 Pfizer appeared to have adopted the same 
approach to its Chinese-language trademarks. The trademark that 
Pfizer eventually chose, Wan Aike, is a sober transliteration of the 
English name and has no particular meaning in Chinese.50 The most 
successful brand names in China are not only transliterations of the 
English name but also have a meaning in Chinese that often 
combines wit and erudition.51 For example, the Chinese 
transliteration of Coca-Cola is ―Keko Kele‖ (可口可乐), which 
means ―Delicious Happiness‖ and the transliteration for P&G (the 
shorten name by which Procter & Gamble is known in China) is 
―Baojie‖ (宝洁), which means ―Precious Cleanliness.‖ Pfizer’s 
chosen Chinese transliteration for Viagra is a collection of sounds 
that have no meaning in Chinese and seem dull and uninspired when 
compared with the wit and humor of Weige. An uninspired and 
scholarly sounding name may have had the unintended effect of 
adding to social pressures in this area. Perhaps for this reason, Wan 
Aike never caught on with Chinese consumers, most of whom still 
identify Viagra with Weige. 
II. PFIZER’S LEGAL DISPUTES OVER THE VIAGRA TRADEMARK  
When Pfizer’s executives realized that Weige had become so 
popular in the Chinese speaking world, they moved quickly to obtain 
trademark registrations for the trademark in China, Taiwan, and 
Hong Kong.52 Pfizer eventually obtained trademark registrations for 
Weige in Hong Kong and in Taiwan,53 but in China, Pfizer was faced 
with many prior competing applications.54 One month after Pfizer’s 
launch of Viagra in the United States in April 1998, several Chinese 
companies filed trademark registrations for Weige with the CTMO.55 
Viamen filed the first application on May 20, 1998 for Weige (along 
 
 49. See Donald G. McNeil, Jr., The Science of Naming Drugs (Sorry, ´Z´ Is Already 
Taken), N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/27/business/ 
28mcne.html, for a discussion of how pharmaceutical companies select drug names. 
 50. See Francis et al., supra note 48 at 99 (―A good brand name should [have] desirable 
properties, such as positive connotations association with the brand name, relevance to the 
product, memorability, and the ability to offer a distinctive image over competing 
products.‖). 
 51. See id. at 104 (noting ―the Chinese cultural norm of imbuing names with special 
(positive) or lucky meanings.‖). 
 52. See LI ET AL., supra note 5, at 29. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. at 9. 
 55. Id. 
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with several other variations in Chinese).56 Pfizer applied for its 
Weige trademark in China on August 12, 1998.57 Under China’s first 
to file system,58 Viamen’s application was deemed by CTMO to be 
first in time and CTMO awarded the Weige trademark to Viamen on 
June 21, 2002 over Pfizer’s protestations.59 Pfizer filed an objection, 
and the Trademark Review and Appeals Board affirmed the CTMO’s 
decision.60 At the time of the Appeals Board’s decision, some 
financial analysts estimated the brand equity of the Weige trademark 
to be between $85 and $120 million.61 The decision to award the 
Weige trademark to Viamen could be viewed as the award of a 
significant business and financial asset to which Pfizer had an 
arguable claim.62  
In October 2005, Pfizer launched a second challenge to the 
Weige trademark in the Beijing First Intermediate People’s Court on 
the theory that it owned the rights to the Weige trademark in China.63 
It argued that even though its trademark application was later in time 
Weige had achieved fame as Pfizer’s trademark under the famous 
trademarks doctrine in China.64 Pfizer further claimed that this fame 
was achieved prior to Viamen’s application and created rights in 
Pfizer and Viamen’s unauthorized use of the Weige trademark 
violated Article 10 of China’s Anti-Unfair Competition Law.65 As 
explained in the next section, in January 2007, the Beijing court 
rejected Pfizer’s claim that it owned the famous trademark Weige and 
in July 2009, Pfizer lost its final appeal on this issue in the Supreme 
People’s Court.66 These court decisions and actions by the State 
 
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. 
 58. CHOW & LEE, supra note 6, at 482-83. 
 59. LI ET AL., supra note 5, at 10. 
 60. Id. at 29.  
 61. Id. at 10.  
 62. See Al J. Daniel, Jr., Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round: The Dunkel Draft 
and a Comparison of United States Intellectual Property Rights, Remedies, and Border 
Measures, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT´L L. & POL. 751, 774 (1993) (―The value of a trademark can be a 
company´s greatest asset.‖).  
 63. LI ET AL., supra note 5, at 29.  
 64. Pfizer v. Beijing Health New Concept Pharm. Co. (Beijing First Interm. People’s Ct., 
Dec. 30, 2006) (China) in ROBERT H. HU, RESEARCH GUIDE TO CHINESE TRADEMARK LAW 
AND PRACTICE 48 (2009) [hereinafter Beijing Health]. 
 65. Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 2, 1993, effective Sept. 2, 1993) 
(Lawinfochina) art. 10(1) (―Managers shall not use the following methods to infringe upon 
business secrecy: to steal coerce, or use any other unfair method to obtain the other’s 
business secrets.‖). 
 66. LI ET AL., supra note 5, at 14. 
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Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) indicate that Guangzhou Viamen 
is now the undisputed owner of the Weige trademark in China. 
A. Principles of International Intellectual Property 
To better understand Pfizer’s legal battles over Viagra in China 
and the hurdles that Pfizer faced, it is important to review some basic 
principles of international intellectual property and the complications 
brought to bear on the case by the unusual cultural and legal issues in 
China. This review will make it clear that Pfizer, despite all its 
experience and resources, did not fully appreciate the problems that 
would arise as a result of these unusual circumstances.  
Under the modern system of international intellectual property, a 
brand owner must register its trademark in every country in which it 
is seeking protection for the trademark.67 Trademarks and patents, 
like most other intellectual property rights, operate under the 
principle of territory.68 Absent special circumstances,69 the U.S. 
trademark has no effect in a country other than the United States. 
Therefore, the brand owner would have to first register the trademark 
in the target foreign country to obtain trademark protection.70 Each 
trademark that is registered is an independent creature of the country 
in which it is registered.71 For this reason, MNCs like Pfizer have a 
 
 67. See CHOW & LEE, supra note 6, at 478. The U.S. system awards the trademark to the 
first to use the mark in commerce even if that party is later in time in filing a trademark 
application with the USPTO. Id. at 482. To win this dispute, the brand owner will need to 
show evidence of prior use in commerce. See id. at 483. Under the first to file system, the 
inquiry is more simple and straightforward: which of the competing applications was filed 
first? Id. This can be determined by checking the dates of the applications filed in the 
trademark office.  
 68. Id. at 478. Copyrights are treated differently. A copyright that is created in any 
country that is a member of the Berne Convention or the WTO automatically acquires a 
copyright in all other Berne or WTO countries without the need for any further action or 
formalities. Id. at 89–90. 
 69. Special circumstances would include a treaty concluded between the United States 
and other countries providing for extraterritorial protection of trademarks and other 
intellectual property rights. E.g., Paris Convention on the Protection of Industrial Property 
art. 4, Mar. 20, 1883, 828 U.N.T.S. 307 (last revised July 14, 1967) [hereinafter Paris 
Convention] (stating that any person who duly filed an application for a trademark in one of 
the State parties shall enjoy, for the purpose of filing in one of the other State parties, a six 
month rights of priority). 
 70. But see id. art. 4(C)(1) (permitting a six-month grace period for filing a trademark for 
nationals of state parties to the Paris Convention).  
 71. See id. art. 6. 
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portfolio consisting of thousands of trademarks and patents from 
around the world.72  
The United States follows a first-to-use system for trademarks.73 
Most other countries, including China, follow a first-to-file system.74 
Under the more popular first-to-file system, the first in time to file a 
trademark registration will win in a dispute between competing 
applications for the trademark.75 By contrast, under the first-to-use 
system, the first to use the trademark in commerce, if proven by 
sufficient evidence, has the right to the trademark regardless of who 
is the first to file.76 The first–to-file system has the advantage of 
simplicity, but it could have the disadvantage of unfairness because it 
can encourage predatory behavior in the form of trademark 
―squatting.‖77 In combination with the principle of territoriality, the 
first-to-file system allows a foreign entity or person to file for a 
trademark in a foreign country before the brand owner and may be 
able to obtain local ownership of the foreign trademark.78  
To address this problem, trademark owners from countries 
belonging to the World Trade Organization (WTO) are entitled to 
enjoy a six-month period of priority under the Paris Convention,79 
incorporated into the WTO by the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs).80 For example, if 
Pfizer filed a trademark application on January 1, 2012 in the 
 
 72. This observation is based on the author’s own experience as in-house counsel for a 
MNC. The author handled intellectual property matters and can confirm that the company 
had hundreds of trademarks and patents in China alone. 
 73. CHOW & LEE, supra note 6, at 483. 
 74. Id. at 482.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Id.  
 77. David Pierson, China's Trademark Squatters Sit Tight, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2012, at 
A1. 
 78. But see Paris Convention, supra note 69, art. 4(C)(1). 
 79. Id.  
 80. The Agreement for Trade Related Intellectual Property rights (TRIPs) is one of the 
major mandatory agreements of the World Trade Organization (WTO). See CHOW & LEE, 
supra note 6, at 56. All members of the WTO must join TRIPs as part of the process of 
accession to the WTO. See id. at 25–26. TRIPs incorporates the bulk of the substantive 
provisions of the Paris Convention, including the period of priority for trademarks and 
patents. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 2, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter TRIPs]. As the United States and China (as well as most of the 
world’s countries) are now members of the WTO and bound by TRIPs, China is bound by 
the principle of Paris Priority for trademarks and patents. See Members and Observers of the 
WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2012). 
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USPTO, Pfizer has until July 2, 2012 to file a trademark application 
in China and is entitled to a China priority filing date of January 1, 
2012.81 Any trademark applications filed in China after January 1, 
2012 will be defeated by Pfizer’s application, which will be 
considered prior in time in China under the Paris Convention and the 
WTO.82 This period of priority is commonly known as Paris 
Priority.83 
Another doctrine used to ameliorate problems of trademark 
squatting and to resolve priority disputes is the famous trademarks 
doctrine, which is a mechanism to overcome the principle of 
territoriality.84 If a trademark has achieved ―fame‖ in a foreign 
country, then the owner of the famous trademark is the owner of the 
trademark in the foreign country even though he never registered the 
trademark.85 The foreign trademark owner will have superior rights 
over a trademark application that is filed after the trademark in 
question has achieved fame in the foreign country.86 In other words, 
the fame of the trademark creates the equivalent of a right of priority 
or ownership in the foreign brand owner who is prior in time to a 
subsequently filed trademark application or the same trademark.87 
Local law usually defines the term ―fame‖ and because fame is 
intangible, the famous trademarks doctrine sometimes allows for 
wide discretion by the local authorities.88  
 
 81. The day of filing is not included in the six month period of priority. Paris 
Convention, supra note 69, art. 4(C)(2). 
 82. See id. at art. 4.  
 83. The same principle applies to patents, except that the period of priority is one year. 
See id. art 4(C)(1).  
 84. Under TRIPS, all WTO members have an obligation to recognize the famous marks 
doctrine of Article 6 of the Paris Convention in their domestic law. TRIPs, supra note 88, 
art. 2(1) (binding all members to Articles 1 through 12, and Article 19 of the Paris 
Convention). 
 85. While the Paris Convention requires the implementation of the famous marks 
doctrine into domestic law, countries have wide lateral in determining the elements of the 
doctrine. See Jing Luo & Shubha Ghosh, Protection and Enforcement of Well-Known Mark 
Rights in China: History, Theory and Future, 7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 119, 120–123 
(2009) (stating the factors China courts use to determine whether there is a famous 
trademark and also that the famous mark protection in China extends to both registered and 
unregistered trademarks). The famous trademarks doctrine is also referred to as the well 
known marks doctrine. See id. at 120.  
 86. Paris Convention, supra note 69, art. 6. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Compare Luo & Ghosh, supra note 85, at 120–21 (discussing the definition of fame 
in Chinese law) with Blake W. Jackson, Notorious: The Treatment of Famous Trademarks in 
America and How Protection Can Be Ensured, 3 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 61, 68–71 
(2009) (discussing different American courts’ interpretation of the term ―fame‖).  
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B. Procedural History of Pfizer’s Disputes Over Viagra in China 
None of these various principles and doctrines ultimately proved 
to be useful to Pfizer in battles over the Weige trademark in China. 
The period of Paris Priority is applicable to the English-language 
trademark, Viagra, for six months after the filing of the trademark in 
the USPTO.89 But the issue in this case was not the English-language 
trademark, but the Chinese-language trademark for Weige. Pfizer was 
not entitled to Paris priority for Weige since Weige was never filed in 
the USPTO. If Pfizer had filed a registration in the USTPO for the 
Chinese characters for Weige, then Pfizer would have been entitled to 
the six-month period of Paris Priority in China for the Chinese 
characters. Under U.S. law, a trademark registration consisting of 
foreign-language words is permitted so long as the characters do not 
refer to a generic term in the original language.90  
Rather, according to Chinese courts, the issue was Pfizer’s 
priority for the application of the Weige trademark in China.91 China 
does not require actual use in commerce as a condition for granting a 
trademark registration, but will invalidate the trademark if it is not 
used within three years of the registration.92 Any natural or legal 
person can apply for a trademark and obtain a registration.93 Since 
use is not a requirement for the filing of a trademark application in 
China, the issue, as framed by the Chinese courts, seemed simple and 
straightforward—Viamen’s application for Weige was filed in CTMO 
on May 20, 1998, whereas Pfizer’s application came almost three 
months later on August 12, 1998.94 On the basis of China’s first-to-
 
 89. Pfizer failed to file its English-language trademark in China within the period of 
Paris Priority. Pfizer filed its Viagra trademark application in the USPTO on April 12, 1996 
but waited until October 24, 1996 to file its trademark application for Viagra in China. 
Compare VIAGRA, Registration No. 2162548 (indicating that Pfizer filed its trademark 
application on April 12, 1996) with VIAGRA, Registration No. 1130739 (China). Pfizer’s 
period of Paris Priority expired on October 13, 1996—six months after the first filing—so 
Pfizer was not entitled to the U.S. filing date for its China trademark application. Pfizer is 
very fortunate that no one filed for the English-language name Viagra before its application 
in China.  
 90. See Otokoyama Co. Ltd. v. Wine of Japan Imp., Inc., 175 F.3d 266, 270–71 (2d Cir. 
1999). 
 91.  Beijing Health, supra note 64. 
 92.  Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, effective Mar. 1, 1983, amended Oct. 27, 
2001) art. 44. 
 93. See id. art. 4. 
 94. LI ET AL., supra note 5, at 29. 
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file system, CTMO considered Viamen’s application to be first in 
time and awarded the Weige trademark to Viamen.95  
Pfizer’s famous trademarks doctrine claim also failed.96 An 
essential element of the famous trademarks doctrine is that the 
famous trademark becomes associated with the trademark owner in 
the mind of consumers.97 To demonstrate fame, brand owners will 
usually provide evidence of a substantial amount of resources spent 
on promoting and advertising the brand and evidence of consumer 
awareness of the brand as belonging to the brand owner in the target 
country.98 In a well-known case, the fast food giant McDonald’s used 
the famous trademarks doctrine to invalidate third-party trademark 
registrations for the McDonald’s trademark and several variations in 
South Africa even though the fast food giant did not have valid 
registered trademarks in South Africa and never did business in South 
Africa.99 The dispute concerned the use of the English-language 
trademark ―McDonald’s‖ (and several variations) in South Africa.100 
McDonald’s introduced evidence of its worldwide advertising and 
promotional revenues used in international media for the McDonald’s 
trademarks that helped to create international fame for the 
trademarks.101 These activities created fame for the McDonald’s 
trademarks not only in the countries where the company had 
registered its trademark, but also in South Africa, which was exposed 
to the international media.102 The fame created an association of the 
McDonald’s trademarks with the U.S.-based MNC McDonald’s in 
the minds of South African consumers.103 As a result, the fame in 
South Africa created the equivalent of a property right in the 
 
 95. See id; Lucy Hornby, U.S. Pleads for China to Keep Trademark Procedure, 
REUTERS, Nov. 7, 2008. 
 96. Beijing Health, supra note 64. 
 97. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210–11 (2000). 
 98. See, I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 42 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating 
that little evidence was presented regarding the subjective view of the potential customers 
and whether they are familiar with the trademark); Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las 
Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that to determine 
whether a trademark has become distinctive courts should look at the existence of 
advertising by the plaintiff).  
 99. McDonald’s Corp. v. Joburgers Drive-Inn Restaurant (Pty) Ltd. 1996, 4 All SA 1 
(A) at 71–72 (S. Afr.).  
 100. Id. at 2.  
 101. Id. at 44–45. 
 102. See id. at 45 (―Although there was no evidence on the extent to which the advertising 
outside South Africa spilled over into this country through printed publications and 
television, it must, in all probability, be quite extensive.‖). 
 103. Id. at 45, 53–55, 62–63.  
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McDonald’s trademarks that belonged to the MNC and this property 
right prevented the third party from registering the McDonald’s 
trademarks.104 McDonald’s achieved this result and won its case in 
South Africa even though McDonald’s had no physical presence in 
that country at the time.105  
In the Viagra case, however, the Chinese courts found that there 
were, in fact, two different trademarks, the English trademark, 
Viagra, and the Chinese trademark, Weige.106 Pfizer had invested vast 
sums of money in basic research and development of Viagra and 
millions of dollars in promoting and advertising Viagra in countries 
around the world.107 But the issue, at least for the courts in China, 
was not whether the English-language trademark achieved fame in 
China, but whether the Chinese-language transliteration, Weige, 
achieved fame in China and came to be identified in the minds of 
Chinese consumers with Pfizer as the owner of the trademark.108 On 
this issue, the Chinese courts compelled Pfizer to prove that Weige 
was identified with Pfizer in China, that Pfizer had spent resources to 
promote awareness of Weige, and that Weige was owned by Pfizer in 
China.109 Pfizer’s evidence on these claims was scant because Pfizer 
did not seek to promote Weige as its own brand in China.110 As 
discussed earlier, Pfizer did not create Weige and it was not, at least 
at the time, consistent with Pfizer’s own business culture and the 
image that it sought for its brands.111 Rather, it might be more 
accurate to surmise that Pfizer’s real initial interest in Weige was to 
obtain a trademark registration to block other Chinese companies 
from using the Weige trademark without its permission and prevent 
 
 104. See id. at 71–72.  
 105. See id. at 3, 71–72.  
 106. Beijing Health, supra note 64. 
 107. See LI, ET AL., supra note 5, at 2 (describing the average expenses for research and 
development of new drugs); Amy Barrett, Pfizer´s Funk, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Feb. 
28, 2005, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_09/b3922001 
_mz001.htm (citing Viagra as the most advertised erectile dysfunction drug).  
 108. See Beijing Health, supra note 64. See also Pfizer Appeals after Losing Battle for 
Chinese Name of Viagra, CHINA.ORG.CN, Feb. 7, 2007, http://www.china.org.cn/english/ 
health/199268.htm [hereinafter Losing Battle].  
 109.  See Losing Battle, supra note 108. 
 110. See Leah Chan Grinvald, A Tale of Two Theories of Well-Known Marks, 13 VAND. J. 
ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 33 (2010) (―Pfizer attempted to prove effective exposure of its claimed 
mark through unsolicited media reports, but the court deemed this an insufficient showing 
that consumers had come to recognize WEIGE as Pfizer´s mark.‖). 
 111. See supra Part I.  
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consumer confusion.112 Pfizer simply had not invested resources to 
promote the fame of Weige in China and create consumer association 
with Pfizer.113 In January 2007, the Beijing Intermediate People’s 
Court rejected Pfizer’s argument that it owned the rights to the Weige 
trademark under the famous trademarks doctrine.114 
Pfizer’s long battle appears to have come to a final, unsatisfying 
end with the Supreme People’s Court rejection of Pfizer’s final 
appeal in 2009.115 Some media outlets in China reported that Viamen 
has since offered to sell the rights to Weige to Pfizer for an exorbitant 
sum.116 This was perhaps Viamen’s intention all along, but Pfizer has 
firmly rejected such overtures.117 Pfizer continues to own the 
competing and less desirable Wan Aike trademark.118 
Pfizer did achieve a victory in a related trademark dispute in 
connection with Viagra in China.119 Stung by its lack of foresight 
concerning the Chinese name for Viagra, Pfizer filed a trademark 
application for the distinctive blue color and three dimensional 
diamond shape of its pill (3D trademark).120 On May 28, 2003, 
CTMO granted a trademark to Pfizer for the shape and color of the 
pill.121 Later, Pfizer sued Viamen and various other Chinese 
companies for infringement of its 3D trademark and sought an 
injunction and $6 million in damages.122 Pfizer prevailed against one 
such Chinese company, Shanghai Dongfang, which the court 
permanently enjoined from using Pfizer’s 3D trademark and ordered 
to pay Pfizer $38,000 in damages, which were never collected.123 
 
 112. Cf. LI ET AL., supra note 5, at 23 (discussing possible grounds for invalidating a 
trademark in China). 
 113. In addition, China has proven resistant to the using the famous trademarks doctrine 
to invalidate Chinese trademark applications in favor of foreign trademarks. Alisa Cahana, 
Note, China’s Protection of Famous and Well-Known Marks: The Impact of China’s Latest 
Trademark Law Reform on Infringement and Remedies, 12 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 
219, 236–39 (2004) (attributing China’s resistance to using the famous trademarks doctrine 
to protectionism and nationalism).  
 114. LI ET AL., supra note 5, at 29. 
 115. See id. 
 116. Id. at 14. 
 117. See id.  
 118. See Chan, supra note 8, at 82. 
 119. Shannon Pettypiece, Pfizer Wins Viagra Trademark Case in China, Gets Public 
Apology, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 28, 2006, 4:43 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news? 
pid=newsarchive&sid=acB1tZOUOH5c&refer=asia.  
 120. See Chan, supra note 8, at 82. 
 121. See LI ET AL., supra note 5, at 29. 
 122. Id. at 13. 
 123. Id. at 13–14. Shanghai Dongfang subsequently filed for bankruptcy. Id. at 14 n.88.  
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Pfizer’s victory on the 3D trademark is no doubt significant, but the 
highest stakes in China concerned the ownership of the Weige 
trademark, not the 3D trademark.  
C. Results of the Protracted Battle over Viagra: The Counterfeiters 
Take Over 
The result of the protracted battle over the Weige trademark in 
China is that the market for the sales of Viagra has been almost 
entirely lost to counterfeiters and pirates.124 Soon after Weige became 
widely known in China, counterfeiters began to sell unauthorized 
versions of aphrodisiacs under the Weige label all over China.125 
Some counterfeits contained some sildenafil, the active ingredient in 
Viagra, while others contained traditional Chinese herbal medicines 
or no useful ingredients at all.126 
The counterfeiters acted with almost total impunity for at least 
three reasons. First, Pfizer was not the registered trademark owner of 
Weige and could not enforce trademark rights against counterfeiters. 
Only the registered trademark owner has standing to bring 
enforcement actions against counterfeiters through China’s 
administrative authorities.127 The registered trademark owner, 
Viamen, was engaged in a protracted legal battle with Pfizer over the 
trademark and may have been too distracted to pursue the 
counterfeiters. Second, the enforcement of trademark rights against 
counterfeiters in China requires considerable resources to hire private 
investigation companies and law firms.128 Many MNCs need to 
expend millions of dollars annually to combat counterfeiting and 
 
 124. Trademark counterfeiting continues to be a serious business problem for MNCs in 
China despite more than a decade of intensive efforts to combat the problem. See generally 
Daniel Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies of Multi-National Companies in China: How a 
Flawed Approach Is Making Counterfeiting Worse, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 749 (2010) 
(discussing the counterfeiting problem in China from the 1990s onward). 
 125. See LI ET AL., supra note 5, at 15; China Court in Viagra Crackdown, BBC NEWS 
(Dec. 28, 2006, 9:57 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6213835.stm (―Viagra was 
introduced in China six years ago and after six months on the market, state media said 90% 
of the blue pills sold in Shanghai were fake.‖). 
 126. Elisabeth Rosenthal, An Age-Old Quest Could Be at an End: Chinese Hail Viagra, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2002 at A1. 
 127. This is based on the author’s own experience as in-house counsel for an MNC in 
China. It is usually possible to convince enforcement authorities to conduct a raid in China if 
the brand owner produces a copy of its trademark registration and then makes an oral 
statement that the infringing use was unauthorized. This simple procedure is usually 
adequate to set a raid in motion within fifteen to thirty minutes of the application by the PRC 
authorities.  
 128. See Chow, supra note 124, at 763–64. 
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piracy.129 It seems unlikely that Viamen had the resources to invest in 
enforcement against counterfeiting when it was also entangled in a 
bitter legal battle with Pfizer. Even if Viamen had such substantial 
resources, it is unlikely that Viamen would have used them. Many 
observers have speculated that Viamen’s real intention all along was 
to force Pfizer to purchase the Weige trademark because Viamen 
believed that this opportunity provided the greatest potential for 
realizing a quick and huge windfall.130 So, neither Pfizer nor Viamen 
have pursued the counterfeiters. As a result, rampant counterfeits of 
Weige have occurred in China and continue to hold a vast majority of 
the market.131 
The distractions and hurdles created by litigation over Pfizer’s 
patent for Viagra in China undoubtedly contributed to the rise of 
rampant counterfeiting of Weige. The frenzy that accompanied the 
launch of Viagra in China led several Chinese companies to 
challenge Pfizer’s patent in China.132 In September 2001, when SIPO 
granted Pfizer’s patent for Viagra, a group of Chinese pharmaceutical 
companies immediately challenged the validity of Pfizer’s patent.133 
The challenge to the patent was not based upon first-to-file priority 
since Pfizer’s patent application for Viagra was first in time. Rather, 
the companies argued that the patent was invalid because it failed to 
satisfy the novelty required in Article 22 of China’s Patent Law, a 
claim that patent law experts felt was unlikely to succeed.134 
Nevertheless, the Patent Review Board of SIPO initially invalidated 
Pfizer’s patent in 2004,135 causing protest by the United States.136 
 
 129. Id. at 767. 
 130. See LI ET AL., supra note 5, at 10-14. 
 131. See id. at 15. 
 132. Id. at 10. 
 133. Id.  
 134. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27, 2008, effective: Apr. 1, 1985) art. 22 (―An invention or utility 
model for which a patent is to be granted shall be novel, inventive and practically 
applicable.‖). 
 135. LI ET AL., supra note 5, at 11.  
 136. In January 2005, U.S. Secretary of Commerce Donald Evans criticized the decision 
to invalidate the Pfizer patent during his visit to China. See Andrew Yeh, Evans Urges China 
to Crack Down on Counterfeits, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/ 
0/e8749dcc-655c-11d9-8ff0-00000e2511c8.html. In addition, the United States Trade 
Representative elevated China to its ―priority watch list‖ in its annual report. 2006 SPECIAL 
301 REPORT, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (2006), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/archive/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2006/2006_Spe
cial_301_Review/asset_upload_file473_9336.pdf. This designation is an indication that 
China might be subject to mandatory trade sanctions under Section 301, a federal statute that 
is part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 for failing to protect U.S. 
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Perhaps because of political pressure, the Beijing High People’s 
Court reversed its decision and ultimately upheld Pfizer’s patent in 
September 2007.137 However, the dispute over Pfizer’s patent and its 
focus on winning legal battles in China was an additional distraction 
that emboldened counterfeiters to make pirated copies. By all 
accounts, counterfeits with the Weige trademark now account for 
seventy to eighty percent of all erectile dysfunction drugs in China 
with an estimated value for counterfeit Viagra to be over $240 
million.138 By contrast, Pfizer’s sales of Viagra under the Wan Aike 
trademark accounted for only $12.1 million in 2004.139  
Even though Pfizer is now the undisputed owner of the patent for 
Viagra, Pfizer’s ownership of the patent is a weak basis upon which 
to enforce its rights against counterfeits sold under the Weige label. 
Proving trademark counterfeiting is relatively easy in China. The 
brand owner only has to display the trademark registration certificate 
to the PRC enforcement authorities and make a claim that the 
infringing use is unauthorized.140 In the case of patent claims, the 
patent owner must demonstrate that it owns the patent and that the 
infringing product violates its patent, which usually cannot be done 
without elaborate scientific analysis.141 Moreover, it is unclear 
whether the multitude of counterfeits sold under the Weige label even 
contains enough of the active ingredient to violate Pfizer’s patent.142 
Perhaps most salient of all, Pfizer has little or no interest in enforcing 
its patent rights against counterfeit pills sold under the Weige label 
because of its acrimonious trademark dispute with Viamen. 
Counterfeit Weige pills can violate two different intellectual property 
rights: the patent owned by Pfizer if the pills contain the active 
 
intellectual property rights. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 301, 19 
U.S.C. § 2411 (2006).  
 137.  See LI ET AL., supra note 5, at 13.  
 138.  Id. at 15. See also China Court in Viagra Crackdown, BBC NEWS (Dec. 28, 2006, 
9:57 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6213835.stm (―Viagra was introduced in 
China six years ago and after six months on the market, state media said 90% of the blue 
pills sold in Shanghai were fake.‖). 
 139. LI ET AL., supra note 5, at 13. 
 140. See Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2001, effective: Mar. 1, 1983) ch. 7.  
 141. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27, 2008, effective: Apr. 1, 1985) ch. 7. 
 142. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, An Age-Old Quest Could Be at an End: Chinese Hail 
Viagra, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2002 at A1. 
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ingredient sildenafil143 since the use of that ingredient is protected by 
Pfizer’s patent and the Weige trademark, which is owned by Viamen 
since the counterfeit Weige pills use the Weige trademark without 
authorization from Viamen. Counterfeit Weige pills without sildenafil 
do not violate Pfizer’s patent and Pfizer cannot enforce its rights 
against such pills.144 Only Viamen can enforce its trademark rights 
against such pills since the trademark was used without Viamen’s 
permission. Similarly, only Pfizer can enforce its patent against pills 
containing sildenafil that do not use the Weige trademark. For 
counterfeit pills containing sildenafil without Pfizer’s consent and 
using the Weige trademark without Viamen’s authorization, however, 
either Pfizer or Viamen can enforce its rights against such 
counterfeits—Pfizer on the basis of its patent and Viamen on the 
basis of its trademark. However, if Pfizer enforced its patent rights 
against these counterfeit Weige pills, the enforcement would also 
benefit Viamen, whose trademark would be protected in the process. 
It should not be surprising that Pfizer has little interest in assisting 
Viamen protect the Weige trademark.  
A review of the history of Pfizer’s disputes over the Viagra 
trademark and patent rights in China indicate that no one, except 
perhaps counterfeiters and pirates, really won the battle over Viagra 
in China. Of course, this was a significant business blow to Pfizer. 
The disputes caused a flood of litigation that did not result in any 
sustained tangible benefits for Pfizer. Similarly, most Chinese 
companies involved did not benefit since their products are also 
harmed by counterfeits. Pfizer’s patent rights in China expire in 
2014,145 but it is unclear that Pfizer will be able to fully exploit its 
patent for commercial purposes given the volume of counterfeits 
available in China and the identity of Weige in the minds of Chinese 
consumers with Viagra. Pfizer must accept that it will only receive 
revenues from the sale of Viagra under the significantly less popular 
and less profitable Wan Aike trademark.  
This battle over Viagra harmed not just Pfizer and other Chinese 
firms, but China as a whole. The flood of Viagra counterfeits and 
other medicines harms China’s economy and consumers who are 
 
 143. Sildenafil is patented by Pfizer. See Peter Loftus, Pfizer Viagra Patent Upheld—U.S. 
Judge’s Ruling Against Teva Preserves Market Exclusivity on Drug Into 2019, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 16, 2011, at B2.  
 144. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27, 2008, effective: Apr. 1, 1985) ch. 7. 
 145. See LI ET AL., supra note 5, at 16. 
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wary of the high levels of counterfeit drugs and products of all 
kinds.146 The inability of Pfizer to capitalize on its product meant that 
Pfizer lost revenues that it otherwise would have generated. 
Furthermore, Pfizer never had the opportunity to expand its 
operations to accommodate what could have been a robust trade. The 
expansion of Pfizer’s operations, with the commitment of additional 
resources and capital, and a strong legitimate trade in genuine Viagra 
would have benefitted China. The award of the Weige trademark to 
Viamen was a discouraging sign to many MNC pharmaceutical 
companies about China as a place to do business.147 Avoiding the 
pitfalls that occurred in the Viagra case may have benefits not only 
for MNCs but for China’s long term economic development as well. 
The next section of this article discusses what lessons might be 
learned from this tale of how an important business opportunity for 
both Pfizer and China was mishandled and lost. 
III. LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 
The analysis in this article leads to the following approaches that 
might have avoided some of the problems that have plagued Pfizer 
concerning its Viagra trademark in China. The approaches below are 
applicable not only to pharmaceutical companies that do business in 
China, but also for any companies that have valuable brands and 
trademarks. Moreover, the lessons gleaned from the Viagra case 
apply both to China and other markets in developing countries with 





 146. See Dina M. Bronshtein, Comment, Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals in China: Could 
Changes Bring Stronger Protection for Intellectual Property Rights and Human Health?, 17 
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 439, 441–43 (2008) (describing the decline in government revenues 
and public safety that result from the sale of counterfeit drugs). Cf. Nicholas Zamiska and 
Heather Won Tesoriero, Drug Headache: As Pfizer Battles Fakes in China, Nation’s Police 
Are Uneasy Allies, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2006, at A1 (recounting the death of infants form 
counterfeited milk powder).  
 147. See Jerker Hellstrom, Pfizer Appeals Against Viagra Trademark Ruling in China, 
REUTERS, Feb. 7, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/02/07/idUSSHA326461200 
70207 (―Pfizer said the ruling by the Beijing First Intermediate People's Court failed to 
support Chinese efforts to create an environment for companies bringing new medicines to 
China,‖ following the Court´s ruling in favor of Viamen in the Weige trademark dispute.‖). 
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A. To Maintain Chinese Brand Control, MNCs Should Develop and 
Obtain a Chinese-Language Trademark in China Prior or 
Simultaneous to the Time That an English-Language Trademark 
is Obtained in the United States for All Important International 
Brands  
MNCs need to understand that China presents an unusual case 
with regard to foreign-language brands and trademarks. No matter 
how prestigious or well known the foreign-language brand, Chinese 
consumers will simply not refer to the brand by its English-language 
or other foreign-language name. Rather, Chinese consumers will 
always refer to the product by a Chinese name. If the brand owner 
does not create a Chinese-language name for the English-language 
trademark, Chinese consumers or media entities will create a 
Chinese-language transliteration of the name. In fact, it is likely that 
as soon as a brand is even discussed informally in electronic 
commerce or in the media, Chinese consumers will create a Chinese 
name for the product. As a result, the foreign-language name may 
gain little recognition in China when not used in combination with 
the Chinese trademark. This cultural practice suggests that MNCs 
must develop a Chinese-language trademark for their products in the 
early stages in the development of their brands. 
Early development of a Chinese brand is consistent with the 
current brand management practices of many U.S.-based MNCs. In 
the modern global economy, MNCs find their brands and trademarks 
are among their most valuable assets.148 MNCs operate under the 
core principle that they must control every facet of how their brands 
are presented to the public.149 MNCs are also meticulous about 
keeping marketing strategies, new products, and brands in 
development confidential. But the case of Viagra indicates that there 
is now a key element that companies have overlooked in their 
strategy. Some MNCs seem to believe that once they have filed for a 
U.S. trademark for their brands in the USPTO they can discuss the 
brand in the media because they are protected in the United States 
and in important foreign markets under the Paris Priority. What the 
Viagra case indicates is that even if companies register trademarks in 
the United States, it may be necessary to keep the English name of 
the trademark out of the media until a Chinese trademark has been 
 
 148. For a discussion of the value of brands in the modern world see Daniel Chow, 
Counterfeiting as an Externality Imposed by Multinational Companies on Developing 
Countries, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 785, 813 (2011). 
 149. See id. at 803. 
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developed and obtained in China. Companies should, then, introduce 
the Chinese trademark before or simultaneously with the launch of 
the English-language trademark in the United States. If the MNC 
develops a Chinese name and obtains a registration of the name as a 
trademark in China, then the MNC can communicate the Chinese 
name to the Chinese media when it launches the English name and 
demand that the media use the trademarked name. If the Chinese 
transliteration is based on a sound understanding of China’s cultural 
attitudes and consumer tastes, there is no reason why the Chinese 
media and Chinese consumers should not accept it. Moreover, there 
may be legal reasons why they may be required to do so, as explained 
below. 
Obtaining a trademark registration for the Chinese transliteration 
before the English name is disclosed to the public entitles the brand 
owner to protection under the PRC Trademark Law and the Anti-
Unfair Competition Law.150 These laws allow a registered brand 
owner to prevent others from creating consumer confusion with its 
PRC trademark.151 The argument for acquiring a Chinese trademark 
earlier in the process is that competing transliterations create 
confusion with the brand owner’s previously registered transliteration 
since they all concern the same product or service.152 The possibility 
of a legal claim against unauthorized or competing transliterations 
could create strong incentives for the Chinese media to accept and 
use the registered Chinese transliterated trademark of the brand 
owner. With the help of local counsel, the brand owner might also be 
able to prevent Chinese companies from creating competing 
transliterations for the English trademark.  
These considerations suggest that the brand owner might wish to 
ensure that it has already obtained a valid Chinese trademark on or 
before the date that it launches the English-language name in the 
United States and makes it public to the international media. In some 
 
 150. Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2001, effective: Mar. 1, 1983) art. 13; Anti-Unfair 
Competition Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 2, 1993, effective Sept. 2, 1993) art. 5. 
 151. Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2001, effective: Mar. 1, 1983) art 13 (prohibiting use 
of imitating trademarks for the same or similar commodity that is likely to cause confusion); 
Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 2, 1993, effective Sept. 2, 1993) art. 5(2) 
(prohibiting the use of similar packaging that may confuse consumers). 
 152. Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2001, effective Mar. 1, 1983) art. 13.  
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cases, the brand owner may need to file a trademark application for 
the Chinese transliteration well in advance of the official launch of 
the product in the United States because the CTMO can take up to a 
year to issue a trademark registration.153 While China uses a first to 
file system, the granting of a trademark is not automatic; the process 
is analogous to U.S. federal administrative law’s notice-and-comment 
requirements. The CTMO will first examine whether the MNC has 
submitted all documents and met all legal requirements.154 The 
CTMO will then publish the application for public comment and 
opposition. If an opposition is filed, then the CTMO must resolve the 
dispute. The resolution of the dispute could delay the issuance of the 
trademark for months, if not longer.155 Thus, MNCs might consider 
filing for a Chinese-language transliteration of its trademark name 
well in advance. In addition, coordinating the application in China 
with its filing in the USPTO will ensure that the MNC will have both 
the Chinese and USPTO trademark registration in hand before the 
product’s official launch.156  
The disadvantage of prior or simultaneously filing for the 
Chinese and the English-language trademark is that it might involve 
extra steps in planning and costs. However, MNCs must understand 
that publicly launching the English-language trademark without 
simultaneously creating a Chinese transliteration likely will result in 
the Chinese media or consumers creating their own transliteration, 
which may lead to the MNC’s loss of control over the Chinese 
trademark. Undoubtedly, the Viagra trademark is an unusual case 
because of the immense, world-wide hype surrounding the drug. Not 
every brand name will receive immediate attention in the Chinese 
media. For some brands, an MNC may be quite safe in launching the 
product under a U.S. trademark and then waiting a period of time 
before creating a Chinese transliteration. The Viagra case, however, 
should serve as a warning that at least in the case of highly 
 
 153. In the case of Weige, a contested mark, the CTMO took over four years to grant the 
trademark to Viamen. LI ET AL., supra note 5, at 29. 
 154. See Regulation for the Implementation of the Trademark Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (promulgated by the St. Council, Aug. 3, 2002, effective Sept. 15, 2002) 
art. 13, 21. Some trademarks will not be accepted for registration. See LI, ET AL., supra note 
5, at 8 (noting CTMO’s unwillingness to register Pfizer’s first trademark application because 
it was too sexually suggestive). 
 155. See LI ET AL., supra note 5, at 29 (demonstrating the four year battle for Viamen to 
gain rights to the Weige trademark by way of Chinese courts). 
 156. Why not just file both the English-language name and the Chinese transliteration in 
the USPTO and obtain a six month period of Paris Priority in which to file the Chinese mark 
in China? See infra Part III.B. 
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anticipated brands, prior or simultaneous filing may be necessary to 
avoid losing control of how the brand is presented in China.  
 In the case of brands that are likely to draw wide interest and 
attention, not only should the MNC obtain registrations for its own 
transliteration for its English-language trademark in China, but the 
MNC should also obtain several other variations of the same 
transliterations in China.157 An English name can be the subject of 
many different transliterations using Chinese words that sound like 
the English name. The MNC should obtain registrations of all the 
possible variations of the Chinese transliteration at the same time. 
In deciding upon a Chinese transliteration or a name in other 
countries with a non-Latin based language, such as India, an MNC 
might need to rethink some of its own entrenched attitudes. Part of 
the spectacular success of Weige is that it touched a receptive chord 
in China and seemed to be in tune with the cultural sensibilities of the 
nation.158 A staid pharmaceutical company that favors names 
carrying an impressive level of gravitas might wish to rethink its 
traditional attitudes and adopt a more flexible approach to China 
where humor, wit, and light heartedness can be quite effective for 
certain types of products. Many MNCs have the resources to conduct 
market research in China and to do focus groups with Chinese 
consumers. An important lesson of the Viagra case is that Chinese 
cultural attitudes and language should be given serious consideration 
when formulating transliterations. MNCs should adopt a more 
precautionary approach and plan well in advance when considering 
Chinese transliteration of their trademarks. 
One other note of caution to MNCs concerns the use of expert 
legal counsel and other consultants. In the past, many MNCs have 
used law firms in Hong Kong because of their facility in English. 
MNCs must understand that Hong Kong is a special administrative 
region of China and operates, in effect, as a separate legal system 
with its own intellectual property laws.159 Lawyers who are trained in 
Hong Kong law schools and pass the Hong Kong bar may not have 
the same level of expertise in Chinese law as lawyers who were fully 
 
 157. Chinese language contains many homophones. For example, the transliteration wei 
could be accomplished using 伟 (great) or 威 (powerful). Both characters have the same 
pronunciation (although different tones). 
 158. See supra Part. I. 
 159. See Paul Tackaberry, Intellectual-Property Laws in the Hong Kong S.A.R.: 
Localization and Internationalization, 42 MCGILL L. J. 579 (1997) for a discussion of 
intellectual property law in Hong Kong.  
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trained and have passed the bar in the PRC. MNCs need lawyers who 
are experts in the PRC legal system, especially in an area such as 
trademarks, which is a field that is both vitally important and full of 
pitfalls and traps for the unwary. Moreover, many MNCs in the past 
have also used advertising and marketing firms in Hong Kong to 
work with law firms to help create Chinese transliterations. While the 
culture in Hong Kong is similar to that of China, there are still 
differences.160 MNCs should hire PRC law firms and a PRC 
marketing firms to test the desirability of various proposed 
transliterations of the English-language trademark with PRC 
consumer groups. 
B. Alternatively, Register the English-language Trademark and its 
Chinese Transliteration Trademark at the Same Time in the 
USPTO and Rely on Paris Priority to File in China  
As an alternative method, the brand owner can file applications 
for its English-language trademark and its Chinese trademark at the 
same time in the USPTO in order to establish a Paris priority filing 
date. The brand owner then can file applications for both trademarks 
in China within the six month Paris priority period and assert the 
benefit of the U.S. filing date for both trademarks in China.161 The 
principle of Paris priority will entitle the brand owner to defeat all 
applications filed in China for either trademark after the first filing 
date in the United States.162  
It is worth emphasizing, however, that the first filing in the 
United States gives the MNC brand owner merely a right of priority 
in China, not a registered trademark.163 The brand owner must take 
the additional step of filing trademark applications for the English-
language trademark and its transliteration in the CTMO. There can be 
a gap of approximately a year and a half between the first filing in the 
United States, the second filing in China, and the ultimate issuance of 
the English- and Chinese-language trademark registrations by the 
 
 160. For example, Cantonese, a spoken dialect, is dominant in Hong Kong whereas 
Mandarin is the official spoken language of China and is universally the language of 
instruction in all PRC schools and in all official government business. Hong Kong also uses 
traditional Chinese characters whereas simplified characters, using few brushstrokes, are 
used in China. See Stephanie M. Greene, Protecting Well-Known Marks in China: 
Challenges for Foreign Mark Holders, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 371, 387 (discussing the linguistic 
differences between mainland China and Hong Kong and the complications this creates for 
foreign companies entering the Chinese market). 
 161. See supra Part II.A. 
 162. See supra Part II.A. 
 163. See supra Part II.A. 
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CTMO.164 Until the CTMO issues the Chinese-language trademark 
registration to the MNC brand owner, the Chinese media, consumers, 
and third parties will be able to create their own transliterations of the 
English-language trademark. Until the Chinese trademark registration 
for the MNC’s own Chinese transliteration of its English trademark is 
actually issued in China, no trademark rights are created in the MNC 
under PRC law. Thus, if the brand owner publicizes the English 
brand name in the media before a trademark registration for its own 
Chinese transliteration is issued, the brand owner will have no legal 
basis upon which to prevent third parties from creating competing 
transliterations and filing trademark applications for these 
transliterations in the CTMO. For these reasons, this procedure, 
although simpler than the method discussed in the previous section, 
provides a lower level of protection against competing 
transliterations. 
A brand owner who uses this approach based on Paris priority 
might be successful, however, if the brand owner is careful to keep 
all information about the English-language brand name confidential 
until the CTMO approves both the English- and Chinese-language 
trademarks registrations. As noted earlier, Pfizer drew attention to the 
brand name Viagra even before it was filed in the USPTO.165 If the 
brand owner does not draw unwanted attention to its English-
language trademark through publicized activities in the United States, 
the brand owner may be able to avoid facing competing 
transliterations until the CTMO issues the trademark registrations in 
China. Once the registrations are issued, the brand owner can then 
publicize the trademarks and demand that the media use the Chinese 
transliteration that is now an officially registered PRC trademark.166 
 
 164. See LI ET AL., supra note 5, at 29 (demonstrating the four year battle for Viamen to 
gain rights to the Weige trademark by way of Chinese courts).  
 165. See supra Part.I. 
 166. It would also be possible for a brand owner to file one single trademark registration 
that includes Chinese characters with the Madrid System under its international registry. The 
Madrid System is under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) and outside of the WTO. The Madrid international registration creates the 
equivalent of a national trademark in all members of the Madrid System and the filing date 
in each national legal system would be the filing date in Madrid. See CHOW & LEE, supra 
note 6, at 506–12. To obtain a Chinese trademark using the Madrid System, the brand owner 
will need to apply for territorial extension of the Madrid registration to China. The CTMO 
will then conduct a substantial examination to determine whether the Madrid registration 
should be extended to China. If the CTMO approves the extension of Madrid protection, 
then the CTMO should issue a certificate of Madrid extension to the brand owner who now 
obtains the equivalent of a trademark registration under PRC law. To use the Madrid system, 
the brand owner must file two applications: one in the United States and then the Madrid 
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CONCLUSION 
Pfizer’s battles over its Viagra trademarks in China illustrate that 
even in today’s modern global economy and even when a powerful 
and sophisticated MNC with vast resources is involved, mistakes and 
miscalculations can occur that seriously undermine business 
opportunities in China. In the case of Pfizer’s battles over its Viagra 
trademarks, these missed opportunities are setbacks not only for the 
MNCs, but also for China itself. In particular, mistakes that are 
rooted in areas that MNCs have not traditionally emphasized, such as 
issues of language and culture, appear to be pitfalls for MNCs in 
China. The registration of trademarks in China in both English and 
Chinese is a field that is full of complexities and traps and, above all, 
requires first rate expert legal advice on the ground in China.  
MNCs must understand that even though China is modernizing 
at an astonishing speed, China is also a country where tradition, 
history, and culture have a stronger hold and influence than many 
other countries. MNCs ignore or underestimate cultural issues in 
China at their peril. Learning the lessons from the tale of Pfizer’s 
missed opportunities in the case of its battles over trademark rights to 
Viagra in China may prove to be a valuable lesson for MNCs doing 
business in China for the future. 
 
application with the USPTO, which then forwards the application to the international 
registry managed by WIPO in Geneva. See id. In the author’s view, it would be simpler, and 
perhaps more effective, to simply file the second application directly in China.  
